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It is the contention of this paper that schools are currently sandwiched between demands
of the economy on one side and increasingly fundamentalist communities on the other;
that schools need some degree of autonomy from each; that the greatest challenge of
the century is how we can live together despite our differences; and that the only way of
successfully meeting this challenge is for schools to put social justice at the heart of their
activities, activities that are best informed by the cultivation of reasoned imagination –
that is, by an aesthetic approach to the development of intellectual, social, cultural,
economic and personal identities.
Keywords: aesthetics; inequality/social exclusion in education; leadership; school
effectiveness and improvement; social justice
The context for aesthetic education
Whilst schools try to adapt to the needs of the economy schoolchildren and students want to
give meaning to their lives. (Touraine, 2000, p. 151)
Everyone wants to change schools. Parents, governments, identity groups, religious sects,
industries, indeed any collection of people gathered together under a particular banner
want schools to change; in particular they want change that reflects more closely their
particular identity and interests. They want change in curriculum that will reflect their
aspirations: for parents, positional advantage and a secure future for their children; for gov-
ernments, national unity and economic competitiveness; for identity groups, celebration
of their (black, feminist, gay) history and importance; for religions, the maintenance of
their particular (Jewish, Christian, Muslim) theology and the conversion of unbelievers; for
industry, the technological and organisational skills that support innovation and production;
and so on.
During the past 30 years the social context for these demands in most Western coun-
tries has largely been one of de-industrialisation, urban segregation, increasing inequality,
immigration and identity politics. The international context has seen: the USA consoli-
date its position as the world’s military hyper-power and its greatest debtor; Europe expand
its borders to the East, while struggling to establish economic and social stability; China,
India and Brazil emerge as significant economic powerhouses; serious instability and out-
side intervention in Central Asia, the Balkans and the Middle East; exponential growth
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60 R. Bates
in communications and surveillance technologies; significant advances in bio-technologies
and associated developments in medicine and agriculture; the global consolidation of trans-
national corporations, the arms industry, organised crime and the drug economy; mass
migrations due to famine, conflict and the increasing disparity between rich and poor coun-
tries; the establishment and operation of the International Court of Justice; the increasing
scale and reach of International Non-Government Organisations; and the emergence of
Global Warming as a scientific, political and economic concern.
This, then, is the inheritance of the twentieth century; a century that Hobsbawm (1994)
named The age of extremes, for it was a century that was both the most murderous in
recorded history in terms of warfare, genocide and famine and a century at the end of which
a significant proportion of the world’s population lived longer, was better educated, better
fed, better able to communicate and better able to move towards their social, economic
and political aspirations than was conceivable at the beginning of the century. But, ‘the
twentieth century is over. The twenty-first opens on twilight and obscurity’ and, as ever,
‘ . . . social injustice still needs to be fought. The world will not get better on its own’
(Hobsbawm, 2005, pp. 412, 418).
Much of the twilight is argued by social scientists such as Touraine (2000, 2007) to
result from the breakdown of traditional social structures that once linked the individual to
larger social groups. On the one hand, the market, through its global reach and its applica-
tion of advanced technologies, has disrupted the individual’s relationship to her work, as
capitalism without end is developed as a field of strategic action, independent of societies,
inherently unstable and careless of the individual. As a result, local solidarity, unionism
and the welfare state are in decline both as a necessary form of organisation and as a com-
promise with capital that is no longer of economic benefit. The consequence is that the
state now has a very limited role in mediating between capital and workers as key decisions
are made at a global level to which states have little connection and over which they have
even less power. The state can therefore no longer operate as a guarantor of society and its
citizens and has lost much of its power to provide a stable context for the development of
institutions and individuals.
As the individual seeks a source of stability and identity that can no longer be found
in such institutions as family, church, local community or work, there is often a turning
towards substitutes for society such as communitarianism. This tends towards two major
forms: hyper-nationalism and fundamentalism. Hyper-nationalism is often associated with
ethnicity and celebrated through mythologies rooted in particular interpretations of the past,
especially in interpretations that celebrate victories and/or humiliations and call for the
exercise of domination or revenge. The aftermath of the break up of Yugoslavia in the
Balkans or the abandonment of Palestine to conflict with Israel are contemporary exam-
ples as is the idea of American (and other) exceptionalisms. Fundamentalism is more often
associated with religion, which, while it provides identity for its adherents, may often sur-
render both reason and any notion of universal human rights. It also impresses ideas of Us
and Them, Good and Evil, Saved and Unsaved, Utopia and Dystopia, in what Huntington
(1996) labels the ‘Conflict between civilizations’ and which Gray (2007) and Touraine
(2007) see as a significant pretext for wars.
With such a history, and in conditions of such uncertainty, why and how should schools
be changed? It is the contention of this paper: that schools are currently sandwiched
between demands of the economy on one side and increasingly fundamentalist commu-
nities on the other; that schools need some degree of autonomy from each; that the greatest
challenge of the century is how we can live together despite our differences; and that the
only way of successfully meeting this challenge is for schools to put social justice at the
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
1:3
0 0
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
 
Critical Studies in Education 61
heart of their activities, activities that are best informed by the cultivation of reasoned
imagination – that is, by an aesthetic approach to the development of intellectual, social,
cultural, economic and personal identities.
An anarchy of cultures
Our world is characterised, particularly in the great metropolitan centres, by an anarchy
of cultures. These arise partly through what Foucault (1980) so wonderfully called ‘the
insurrection of subjugated knowledges’ (81) and partly through mass migration within
and between countries and continents. In the first instance the struggle for recognition by
different groups within a society who wish not only to celebrate their particular way of
life, but also to perform their culture within the wider society, makes visible a diversity of
cultural groups and their claims to be recognised as legitimate cultures, each with a legit-
imate way of life. This demand for recognition is in many cases accompanied by claims
for recompense and restitution as a result of historical injustice. Similarly the migration of
populations between countries – as workers relocate as a result of the demand for labour;
as colonial subjects claim right of access to the centre of empire; or as refugees migrate
as a result of war, famine and destitution – also results in an increasing diversity of cul-
tural claims. The result is an anarchy of cultures, all of which compete not only through
political processes but also through aesthetic mechanisms: the creation or promulgation of
a particular literature; the production and dissemination of particular symbolic artefacts;
the construction and presentation of a unique history; the performance of particular rituals
and cultural theatre; the development and promotion of an identifiable music; the capture
of time and space in various media through which to assert their claims and identity.
The resultant cacophony produces several reactions. Firstly, those with economic or
political power may attempt to co-opt the means of communication to promote a particu-
lar cultural view as being of universal value or as being ‘in the nature of things’ or as the
result of historical necessity. As Walter Benjamin (as cited in Bates, 2006) argued, in such
circumstances art becomes a tool of politics, ‘a means of propaganda and manipulation,
substituting an artificial unity of purpose and ideals while repressing and marginalizing
other aesthetic representations of politics and ethics, particularly those concerned with
changing the status quo’ (p. 207). One extreme example of this was the adoption by
Fascist states such as Germany and Italy of the unifying aesthetic of society as a machine:
dominant, male, powerful, combative.
Such masculine beauty was celebrated erotically by Marinetti (as cited in Bates, 2006)
in his attempt to replace the centrality of Woman and Beauty in traditional aesthetics with
a monstrous invocation of the mechanical ‘ . . . the wholly mastered, definitive future aes-
thetic of great locomotives, twisting tunnels, armoured cars, torpedo boats, monoplanes
and racing cars’ on which ‘the young modern male’ will focus his attention as objects that
‘ . . . glow with pleasure beneath his ardent caress’ (pp. 207–208).
The object of all this masculinised hyperbole was, of course, the subjection of the
individual (especially women) to a particular view of a unified, nationalistic, gendered
conception of the self in service of a particular image of the nation engineered by the
artist/politician/salesman.
Similarly, in this vein contemporary advertising and mass media employ aesthetic
means to promote a particular image of the individual and the economy as overwhelmingly
concerned with production and (especially) consumption, where what you buy is what you
are: I shop, therefore I am!
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62 R. Bates
At the individual level, some people may solve the problem of diversity by with-
drawing into a traditional or contemporary communitarian group, where the difficulty
of decision-making is removed through submission to authority, rules and prohibitions
(Fromm, 1941). Here the requirement is similar to that required by the aestheticised state:
belief and submission. In extreme forms this involves belief and submission that is not
open to question; where texts are literally interpreted or interpreted only by authority;
where membership precludes participation in, or even knowledge of other cultures and
communities with different ways of life; where failure of commitment or questioning of
belief or challenge to authority leads to punishment or exclusion. Many such communitar-
ian groups have religious or ethnic foundations, or indeed a combination of both, where
aestheticised symbols of belonging, of status, of authority, of belief are compulsory and
mark off believers from unbelievers; the chosen from the unchosen; purity from danger; us
from them.
In less extreme forms the collection of like-minded people together in (sometimes
gated) communities provides a similar insulation from diverse beliefs and ways of life.
As Bishop (2009) and Lilla (2010) suggest, such voluntary sorting has been taking place
for decades where people:
. . . have been withdrawing into communities of like-mindedness where the gap between indi-
vidual and collective closes . . . [and] where they share their neighbours general political
outlook and where they can be sure that their voices will be echoed back to them. (Lilla,
2010, p. 54)
Such gathering together in particular neighbourhoods is also characteristic of members of
various diasporas (Dufoix, 2008) which, as with like-minded communities, may well invoke
a certain aesthetic in their appreciation of literature, art, film, media, architecture, music,
religion, food, clothing, history etc.
In each of these cases it has been customary to think of such groups as exhibiting partic-
ular ‘ways of life’ which, in turn, are related to each other in social, economic and symbolic
space (Bourdieu 1984, 1993). While there is obvious truth in such analysis, it runs the dan-
ger of reifying cultures as immutable ‘ways of life’, invariant and unchanging. However,
more recently, the study of culture as a way of life has mutated into the study of cultural
practices, exhibited, for instance, in conversations rather than in structures (Ricoeur, 1986).
The implications of this shift are considerable as:
Such a position leads to a rather different view of society: one which is articulated not through
structure but through negotiation between cultural practices of enormous diversity. Society is
a series of multiple ‘realities’ each of which struggles to articulate its interests and under-
standings through struggle and negotiation with other ‘realities’. Meaning itself is produced
through struggle and articulated through the aesthetics of language, symbolism, performance
and artifice. (Bates, 2006, p. 214)
The result may well be that, as cultural practices rub up against each other in the complex-
ities of everyday life, they exchange information, ideas, symbols, artefacts, performances,
stories and so on. Experience of such difference may well challenge specific cultural tradi-
tions and lead to misunderstandings and confusions as well as incomprehension and dismay
as individuals attempt to negotiate their way out of one (or more) cultures and into another.
Such negotiations are well illustrated in the novels of contemporary authors such as Zadie
Smith, Aravind Adiga and Gautam Malkani. On the other hand, it is also possible for such
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
1:3
0 0
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
 
Critical Studies in Education 63
negotiations to allow individuals to appropriate previously unfamiliar cultural practices into
their daily lives (a taste for Asian food; enjoyment of Reggae; conversion to Islam etc.).
What this also means is that through such negotiations, abandonments and appropria-
tions, a process of cultural hybridisation is entered into where individual adaptations bridge
and transform cultural practices (Rizvi, 1997). Cultural practices only exist in the expres-
sions of individuals and groups and they are subject to constant modification, especially
where interaction opens up alternatives. Cultures must be seen then as simultaneously a
‘way of life’, a way of managing change and a process of forming identity. Individuals are
the mechanism of negotiation. As they use various aesthetic mechanisms in this process
of negotiation they not only reconstruct their ways of life, but also reconstruct themselves
through changed cultural practices.
Aesthetics and the construction of the self
Charles Taylor, in his ground-breaking book Sources of the self (1989) and perhaps more
pointedly in hisMalaise of modernity (1991), argues against the inward psychological quest
for the authentic self, suggesting that instead of looking inwards for the grail we look
outwards and see the self as being constructed by individuals from the various ‘selves’
with which they come into contact.
From this point of view the self is therefore both a social and an imaginative construct:
social in that alternative possibilities are presented through contact with various unfamiliar
cultural practices and imaginative in that the incorporation of such cultural practices into
the self involves a projection of the self into the future. The individual might well be asking
‘what would it be like if I abandoned this behaviour and idea of myself and adopted that
behaviour instead; what would I be like and how would I relate to others in the future?’
The construction of the self is in fact an aesthetic project involving the appropriation of
others’ ideas and ‘presentations of self’ through language, music, performance, art, food,
clothing etc. The construction of the self therefore involves continuous boundary crossing,
either through contact with individuals with different selves representing differing ways
of life or through aesthetic representations of such selves and ways of life. Through such
representations in art, literature, music and drama it is possible to imagine alternative ways
of life, alternative ways of being, and to incorporate or reject such understanding as relevant
or incompatible with a particular personal construction of the self.
In either case, border-crossing may have significant implications. It may involve not
simply adding to the repertoire of one’s self (learning to play the piano, completing a
degree, joining a club) but also a simultaneous subtraction (becoming an atheist and leav-
ing the church; acknowledging a gay identity and separating from a heterosexual way of
life; defecting from the military in the face of an unjust war etc). Some such additions or
transitions are relatively untroubling: developing a taste for Indian food; discovering black
literature; joining a choir etc. The consequences of other transitions may be severe: the pos-
sibility of ‘honour’ killing as a result of violating an authoritarian code of practice; public
vilification for adopting unpopular causes; pariah status as a result of challenging a closed
community; excommunication for ‘heresy’ etc.
The construction of the self (or as Touraine prefers to call it the Subject) is, therefore,
simultaneously an exercise in imagination in projecting what an adoption of alternative
cultural practices might mean; an aesthetic judgement concerning the presentation of the
self that such change might imply; an emotional commitment to or rejection of change; and
a rational consideration of the consequences of the change.
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64 R. Bates
Aesthetics and imagination
The increasing diversity of cultural practices not only results in an anarchy of cultures, but
also demands the development of our capacity for imagining and understanding other ways
of life. Only with such a capacity can we hope to address Touraine’s (2000) central ques-
tion: Can we live together? The development of such a capacity is very much dependent on
the exercise of imagination which, in turn, is very much dependent upon the development
of aesthetic competence. Only on such a basis can we bridge the familiar to the unfamiliar
in what Taylor (1992) calls a ‘fusion of horizons’. As he explains:
. . . for a culture sufficiently different from our own, we may have only the foggiest idea . . .
of what its valuable contribution might consist. Because, for a sufficiently different culture,
the very understanding of what it is to be of worth will be strange and unfamiliar to us.
To approach, say, a raga with the presumptions of value implicit in the Well Tempered Clavier
would be forever to miss the point. What has to happen is . . . a ‘fusion of horizons’. We learn
to move in a broader horizon, within which what we have formerly taken for granted as the
background to valuation can be situated as one possibility alongside the different background
of the formerly unfamiliar culture. The ‘fusion of horizons’ operates through our developing
new vocabularies of comparison. ( p. 67)
The development of an aesthetic imagination is, therefore, fundamental to the process
of incorporating the new and strange into our consciousness and fundamental to the
negotiation of differing cultural practices through which we learn to live together.
In his Art as experience Dewey (1980) argued that this imaginative process was fun-
damentally aesthetic, in which the (re)construction of the self and the (re)construction of
society are simultaneously achieved through the capacity to look at things as if they could
be otherwise. What is necessary, he suggests, is the development of:
. . . a way of seeing and feeling things as they compose an integral whole. It is the large and
generous blending of interests at the point where the mind comes into contact with the world.
When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When the new
is created, the far and the strange become the most natural inevitable things in the world. There
is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, and this adventure
is, in its measure, imagination. (p. 267)
Imagination by itself, however, is not sufficient. Even though some aesthetic presenta-
tions of cultural practices can engage, and indeed on occasion overwhelm, the emotions,
a judgement still needs to be made of the consequences and the value of such imaginative
experience. Such judgement depends firstly upon an awareness of the technologies involved
in the aesthetic presentation of the cultural practice and secondly upon a rational considera-
tion of the consequences of the possible ‘fusion of horizons’ were the cultural practice to be
incorporated into the self. Imagination, rationality and judgement are, therefore, inextrica-
ble in the consideration of the aesthetics of particular cultural practices and their acceptance
or rejection as a component of the developing self.
Aesthetics and institutional life
The formation of the self is, however, seldom a completely autonomous project.
Institutional structures, communities of belonging, historical traditions, close personal rela-
tions, all project the power to constrain and coerce the individual. Despite the fact that
‘society’ as we have known it is decomposing under the pressure of global markets and the
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Critical Studies in Education 65
historical meaning of institutions is everywhere in question, we are surrounded by struc-
tures that mobilise particular interests and constrain others. That is indeed the point of
their existence: organisations are the mobilisation of bias. This being so, Touraine (2007)
suggests:
The subject is formed in the will to escape these forces, rules and powers that prevent us from
being ourselves, that seek to reduce us to the condition of a component of their system and
their sway over everyone’s activity, intentions and interactions. These struggles against what
strips us of the meaning of our existence are always unequal struggles against a power, against
an order. The only kind of subject is a rebel one, divided between anger and hope. (p. 101)
Institutions and organisations invariably present their biases through aesthetic technologies,
technologies that are designed to engage and persuade. Such technologies may encourage
the ‘willing suspension of disbelief’ as Samuel Taylor Coleridge suggested. Indeed the
willing suspension of disbelief is a key premise in the presentation of myth and fable:
werewolves, zombies, unicorns, dragons, invisible men, astral travel, superheroes, ghostly
apparitions and so on. In such cases we may well suspend rational thought and judgement
so as to enjoy the pleasure of imagining things that cannot be. However, institutions are a
different matter. They attempt to use aesthetic means to persuade us to accept their version
of reality, to suspend our disbelief, our rationality, and accept their definition of reality, thus
privileging their interests above our own.
Should such aesthetic persuasion fail then other mechanisms of forcing compliance may
well be employed: economic, legal, psychological, coercive, violent, for, as Weber (1947)
suggested, the ultimate means of politics is violence. The question then becomes:
. . . how are we to defend and enhance the creative freedom of the subject against the waves
of violence, unpredictability and arbitrariness that increasingly roll over the social space?
(Touraine, 2007, p. 70)
Such a question inevitably links issues of the aesthetic construction of the self with
questions of power and social justice.
Aesthetics and social justice
If the construction of the self is an imaginative project conducted through a combination of
experience, aesthetics, rationality and judgement, then the fundamental human right would
seem to be the freedom to construct one’s self compatible with the freedom of others to
do so. But, as Rousseau (1762/1968) suggested ‘man is born free but everywhere he is in
chains’ (p. 1). Powers, authorities, institutions and social arrangements invariably constrain
the freedom of the individual, and they do so differentially. They may do so in terms of the
self-interest of the powerful, but they may also do so in terms of some imagined Utopia or
ideal society. However, as Gray (2000) suggests, such ideals frequently attempt to impose
a particular order, a particular set of value and beliefs, as a universal system. The conse-
quence is that alternative sets of defensible values and beliefs are excluded. A ‘universal’
system can only be achieved, ultimately, by the use of violence (Gray, 2007).
Gray (2000) appeals for an alternative approach to social justice – not one rooted in
a universalistic form of imposed political organisation, but rather one based upon modus
Vivendi:
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66 R. Bates
The aim of modus vivendi cannot be to still the conflict of values. It is to reconcile individuals
and ways of life honouring conflicting values to a life in common. We do not need common
values in order to live together in peace. We need common institutions in which many forms
of life can coexist. (pp. 5–6)
This does not mean that all ways of life and all kinds of behaviour are to be tolerated, but
rather that all ways of life are held up to continuous scrutiny and evaluation for the ways
in which they facilitate or constrain the ability of individual subjects to exercise freedom
in the choices that they make for themselves consistent with an equal freedom for others to
do likewise.
This presents a rather different conception of the ‘ideal’ society, one which does not
demand that one set of values/way of life be adhered to universally, but one where the focus
of institutions is on the elimination of constraints on individuals to choose values/ways of
life limited only by the freedom of others to do likewise and by rational discussion of
alternatives and their consequences.
Sen (2009) argues similarly that, rather than focus on the imposition of a singular uni-
versal conception of social justice, what we need is a focus on reducing injustices, about
which there is more likely to agreement. Moreover in his earlier work (1992, 1999) he set
out an argument that justice depends on the degree of freedom available to the individual
to achieve a valued way of life and that this needs to be judged according to both the actual
achievement and the freedom to achieve.
Achievement relates to the ability of the individual to make the most of circum-
stances. This ability is, however, likely to be circumscribed by institutional, most especially
economic and social, arrangements that foster or deny the capabilities that it might be pos-
sible for the individual to achieve. Sen (1999) suggests five essential freedoms that allow
individuals to develop their capabilities: political freedoms, economic facilities, social
opportunities, transparency guarantees and protective security (p. 10). He argues that:
In analysing social justice, there is a strong case for judging individual advantage in terms of
the capabilities that a person has, that is, the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the
kind of life that he or she has reason to value. (p. 87)
Nussbaum (2000) has elaborated Sen’s list of capabilities and suggests that there might be
10 that are of importance: Life; Bodily Health; Bodily Integrity; Senses, Imagination and
Thought; Emotions; Practical Reason; Affiliation; Other Species; Play; Control over One’s
Environment (2000, p. 82). Of these capabilities two are of particular importance:
. . . Practical Reason and Affiliation stand out as of special importance, since they both orga-
nize and suffuse all the others, making their pursuit truly human. To take just one example,
work, to be a truly human mode of functioning, must involve the availability of both practical
reason and affiliation. It must involve being able to behave as a thinking being, not just a cog in
a machine; and it must be capable of being done with and towards others in a way that involves
mutual recognition of humanity. (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 82)
The question of social justice revolves, therefore, around the capacity of various institu-
tions and organisations of social life to facilitate the development of capabilities that allow
individuals to negotiate and pursue a way of life that they have reason to value. Social jus-
tice is, therefore, inextricably bound up with reason and imagination and the capacity of
individuals and social institutions to facilitate the exercise of reason and imagination in the
pursuit of valued ways of life. Social institutions can be evaluated against such criteria:
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Critical Studies in Education 67
Individuals live and operate in a world of institutions. Our opportunities and prospects depend
crucially on what institutions exist and how they function. Not only do institutions contribute
to our freedoms, their roles can be sensibly evaluated in the light of their contributions to
our freedom. To see development as freedom provides a perspective in which institutional
assessment can systematically occur. (Sen, 1999, p. 142)
The fundamental issue at stake here is our capacity to exercise reason and imagination in
the construction of both our selves and our institutions and to develop an aesthetic in which
reason and imagination are joined with ideas of social justice in ways that promote the
freedom of all.
Aesthetics and the school
The traditional role of the school as an institution has been, at least since the nineteenth
century, socialisation of the young into an existing society and the development of skills
appropriate to a position within that society, a position usually defined by inherited char-
acteristics such as class, race, gender, geography and occupation. It will be clear from the
preceding argument that the school is finding it increasingly difficult to fulfil such demands,
for the social context of the school is increasingly unstable. This presents institutional chal-
lenges for the school as well as psychic challenges for its pupils, for traditional concepts of
class, race, gender, geography and work and the coincidences between them that gave mean-
ing to the work of the school are undergoing continuous challenge and change. In addition,
while markets have become the ‘organising’ principle of many societies, their instability
and the associated constant reinvention of technologies, products and production processes,
combined with the global flows of capital and the relocation of factories, provide little sta-
bility towards which either school or individual can direct their efforts. At the same time,
increasing demands for the teaching of ‘marketable skills’ and for a return to (various)
‘traditional values’ make the adaptation of schools to changing circumstances additionally
difficult.
These demands are counterproductive as they are based on assumptions that no longer
hold. Firstly, in terms of work, that there are a specifiable range of skills and understandings
that can be developed in schools that will allow students to be allocated to various options
within a stable work environment. Secondly, in terms of culture, that there is an agreed
universal set of values into which pupils can be socialised. Neither of these conditions
apply in contemporary societies, yet the curriculum, pedagogy and assessment practices
of schools are largely based upon such historical assumptions, as are their consensual and
differentiating rituals (Bernstein, 1975). The result is alienation from school on the part of
many pupils and significant frustration on the part of teachers who are required to teach as
though traditional forms of socialisation, selection and allocation still apply. As one young
man explained why he hated teachers and social workers ‘they lie to us, mislead us. They
call on us to integrate into a disintegrated society’ (Touraine, 2007, p. 69).
Traditional forms of socialisation, selection and allocation are, as we have seen, con-
tradicted by the conditions of our contemporary world, characterised as it is by mobility,
diversity, instability and gross differences in wealth and power. Moreover, adherence to
such forms fails to address issues of mobility, diversity and instability or to mitigate the
most extreme forms of inequality and exclusion. As a consequence the school fails to con-
nect with the most important determinants of many pupils’ lives, relegating their economic,
social, cultural, religious and familial identities to the private sphere and excluding exami-
nation of them from the public work of schools. Yet it is these identities from which pupils
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68 R. Bates
construct much of their identity as a person, as a Subject. They are also often the parts of
themselves that they find most problematic.
The result is a disconnection of the process of constructing the self, which is the central
preoccupation of pupils, from the pedagogical regime of the school. ‘Whilst schools try to
adapt to the needs of the economy schoolchildren and students want to give meaning to
their lives’ (Touraine, 2000, p. 151). But there are exceptions to this experience. It is surely
not coincidental that so many adults report that particular teachers not only helped them
to learn but also gave meaning to their lives by helping them imagine a particular kind of
identity and future for themselves, one that they had not previously considered.
If schools are to help students give meaning to their lives it would seem that they need
not only to focus on technical mastery of knowledge and skill formation, but, most impor-
tantly, to focus on the means by which students exercise imagination in the construction of
themselves as Subjects. The core of the school’s activities needs, therefore, to be the devel-
opment of rational imagination through aesthetic processes of border-crossing into other
cultures, religions, circumstances, ways of life. Only by such aesthetic means can we begin
to address the question ‘Can we live together’. Only by such means can the student come to
understand what she might value and appropriate from other ways of life in the construc-
tion of herself. Only by processes of rational consideration and aesthetic judgement can the
student decide what it is that she no longer wishes to be. Only through such processes can
issues of social justice based upon the pursuit of individual freedom consistent with the
freedom of others be addressed.
Changing schools: an aesthetic project
Clearly, if schools are to reconnect with pupils, the aesthetic project of the development
of the self through imagination, understanding and judgement of the personal value of
possible futures needs to become central to teaching and learning. The separation of public
from private ways of being needs to be bridged. The varieties of experience brought to the
school by its pupils but excluded from the curriculum need to be embraced. Unexamined
ways of life need to be imaginatively engaged with so as to open up future possibilities
for students who have previously had few such alternative options. Ways of living together
with difference need to be explored. Processes of judgement between alternatives need to
be developed. Projection of the self into possible futures needs to be made possible. Issues
of risk and safety need to be considered.
By putting the task of ‘self-construction’ at the heart of the school’s activity the school
would in fact make good its proclaimed concern for its pupils. By making the incorporation
of diversity and difference into the curriculum a priority the school would both open up
possibilities for its students and simultaneously facilitate shared understanding. Curriculum
theorists such as Quicke (1999) argue for just such a reorientation of the school:
Indeed, one of the important aims of the curriculum is to show how diversity and difference
can be expressed and appreciated through cultural development, whilst at the same time recog-
nizing the importance of the growth of a common understanding based on democratic values.
(p. 160)
Such an agenda demands significant change in the activities of schools. In fact it demands
that aesthetics be placed at the heart of the school in ways that engage and excite the imag-
ination, that exploit the power of aesthetics to engage both reason and emotion and open
up possibilities for the formation and reformation of the self and of social institutions and
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ways of life. Such an agenda would require a change in the language of the classroom
from a preoccupation with mastery to a language of possibility that involves alternatives
and choices and which engages the emotions as well as ethical consideration based upon
notions of social justice. It would require an approach in which:
The student is encouraged to build creatively and critically on existing knowledge and expe-
rience, but creativity also requires the emotional and moral engagement of the self, and that
presupposes the development of a multiplicity of shared meanings between teachers and pupils
which make the experience ‘personal’ as opposed to ‘impersonal’. (Quicke, 1999, p. 161)
There are strong political, social and economic pressures on schools to avoid the personal,
to socialise students through the ritualisation of curriculum, pedagogy and assessment
that classifies them into various categories and treats them as objects rather than sub-
jects. The consensual and differentiating rituals of the school result in an aesthetic that
limits rather than liberates imagination, sensitivity and creativity, when students would
be better served by an aesthetic that recognises students’ life stories and helps them
project their stories into futures that can be imagined and, perhaps, realised. As Maxine
Greene (1988) suggests, some teachers are well aware of the importance of this alternative
aesthetic:
Those of us who ‘do’ aesthetic education, those of us who try to find spaces for it in problematic
schools, are sensitive to the multiple life stories young people are carrying with them into
our classrooms. We are sensitive to the multiple voices that need to be heard, the multiple
vantage points from which the young look at an often uncaring world. At once, we are aware
of what are thought of as multiple intelligences, as diverse symbol systems and languages for
interpreting what presents itself as reality. And we are particularly conscious of the importance
of imagination, so often omitted from education reports: imagination that allows us to open
windows and disclose visions of what might be. (p. 110)
Changing schools in ways that would be more appropriate to the current complexity, diver-
sity and uncertainty of the contemporary social context and more focused upon providing
the tools for pupils development of the self demands putting the aesthetic project of devel-
oping imagination and judgement at the core of the school’s activities – imagination and
judgement informed by the consideration of various ways of life, various possibilities for
the construction of the self, various possible futures, all within the context of the search for
a freedom for the self limited only by an equal freedom for others. The struggle to change
schools is indeed ‘a cultural struggle for the meaning of school learning and for personal
and collective futures’ (Wrigley 2003, p. 178).
Notes on contributor
Richard Bates is Professor of Social and Administrative Studies in the Faculty of
Education at Deakin University, Australia. His scholarly work has been concerned with
the Sociology of Education (where he contributed to the debate over the ‘new sociology
of education in the 1970s’); with Educational Administration (where he contributed to
the emergence of an alternative ‘critical’ theory during the 1980s); and with the glob-
alisation of teacher education. His current preoccupations are with social justice and
educational leadership and with the emergence of international schooling as a global
phenomenon.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
1:3
0 0
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
 
70 R. Bates
References
Bates, R. (2006). Towards an aesthetics for educational administration. In E. Samier & R. Bates
(Eds.), Aesthetic dimensions of educational administration and leadership (pp. 206–221).
London: Routledge.
Bernstein, B. (1975). Ritual in education. In (Ed.), Class codes and control. Vol 3: Towards a theory
of educational transmission (pp. 76–84). London: Routledge.
Bishop, B. (2009). The big sort: Why the clustering of like-minded America is tearing us apart. New
York: Mariner Books.
Bourdieu, P. (1984). Distinction: A social critique of the judgment of taste (R. Nice, Trans.).
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Bourdieu, P. (1993). The field of cultural production (R. Johnson, Trans.). Cambridge: Polity Press.
Dewey, J. (1980). Art as experience. New York: Perigree Books.
Dufoix, S. (2008). Diasporas. Los Angeles: University of California Press.
Foucault, M. (1980). Power/knowledge. New York. Pantheon.
Fromm, E. (1941). Fear of freedom. London: Routledge.
Gray, J. (2000). The two faces of liberalism. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Gray, J. (2007). Black mass: Apocalyptic religion and the death of utopia. London: Penguin.
Greene, M. (1988). The dialectic of freedom. New York: Teachers College Press.
Hobsbawm, E. (1994). Age of extremes: The short twentieth century 1914–1991. London: Michael
Joseph.
Hobsbawm, E. (2005). Interesting times: A twentieth-century life. New York: New Press.
Huntington, S. (1996). The clash of civilizations. London: Simon & Schuster.
Lilla, M. (2010). The tea party Jacobins. New York Review of Books, LVII(9), 50–54.
Nussbaum, M. (2000). Women and human development: The capabilities approach. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Quicke, J. (1999). A curriculum for life. Buckingham: Open University Press.
Ricoeur, P. (1986). Lectures on ideology and utopia. New York: Columbia University Press.
Rizvi, F. (1997). Beyond the East-West divide: Education and the dynamics of Australia-Asia
relations. Australian Educational Researcher. 24(1), 13–26.
Rousseau, J-J. (1968/1762). The social contract. Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin.
Sen, A. (1992). Inequality re-examined. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Sen, A. (1999 ). Development as freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sen, A. (2009). The idea of justice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, C. (1989). Sources of the self . Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Taylor, C. (1991). The malaise of modernity. Concord, ON: Anansi Press.
Taylor, C. (1992). Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press.
Touraine, A. (2000). Can we live together? Cambridge: Polity Press.
Touraine, A. (2007). A new paradigm for understanding today’s world. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Weber, M. (1947). The theory of social and economic organization. New York: Free Press.
Wrigley, T. (2003). Schools of hope. Stoke on Trent, UK: Trentham Books.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [D
ea
kin
 U
niv
ers
ity
 L
ibr
ary
] a
t 2
1:3
0 0
5 J
an
ua
ry
 20
14
 
